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American Vending Services, Inc. v. Morse: The
Problem of Defective Incorporation in Utah
As a general rule, individuals are personally liable for the
liabilities that flow fkom their business dealings. The protection
of the corporate shield, however, is an exception t o this rule. It
protects shareholders from being personally liable for the
liabilities of the corporation. In order t o invoke this protection
the corporation must be formed and maintained with the
proper formalities. When these formalities are not precisely
adhered t o in formation, no corporation exists, and
consequently, there is no corporate shield for shareholders.
In an attempt to protect shareholders who inadvertently
fail t o comply with the formalities of incorporation, the common
law developed the doctrines of de facto corporations and
corporation by estoppel,' which, when applicable, protected
shareholders and third parties dealing with defectively formed
corporations.
Over the years the application of the doctrines of de facto
corporations and corporation by estoppel has become one of the
most confusing areas of the law. In response, many states,
including Utah, have adopted the Model Business Corporation
Act, or similar legislation that attempts t o create a bright-line
rule regarding corporate formation and shareholder liability. In
the wake of this legislation, there still remains confusion about
whether the doctrines of de facto corporations and corporation
by estoppel are completely dead or are still applicable in
limited circumstances.
American Vending Services, Inc. v. Morse2 is the first case
in which Utah courts have addressed the effect of the Utah
Business Corporation Act on these doctrines. This note
distinguishes the facts and the holding of Morse from other
factual situations involving these doctrines that will arise
1. See, e.g., Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 444-45 @.C. 1964).
2. 881 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1994), cert. denied, No. 940470 (Utah Jan. 10,
1995).
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under the Act and offers suggestions about how the doctrine
should be applied.
This note begins with a summary of the facts of Morse and
the Utah Court of Appeals' reasoning. It then traces the
background of the doctrines of de facto corporations and
corporation by estoppel a t common law and how these doctrines
led to the drafting of the Model Business Corporation Act.
Next, the note analyzes the decision of the court of appeals,
concluding that the court correctly found that the Utah
Business Corporation Act eliminated the doctrine of de facto
corporations. It concludes, however, that while the court
reached the right result with respect to corporation by estoppel,
t h e court's language eliminating the doctrine i n all
circumstances is too broad and if followed would limit the
court's ability to prevent injustice. Finally, this note articulates
a test by which courts can apply the Utah Business
Corporation Act where applicable and still use the doctrine of
corporation by estoppel to prevent injustice.

A. The Facts
Douglas M. Durbano and Kevin S. Garn3 purported to
enter into a contract on behalf of American Vending Services,
Inc. (American Vending) with Wayne L. and Dianne L. Morse
to buy a car wash. At the time the parties executed the contract, the articles of incorporation for American Vending had
not been filed, although Mr. Durbano had received permission
from the Utah Division of Corporations to use the name American Vending Services, Inc. Twice prior to the execution of the
contract, Mr. Durbano had tried to file the articles, but they
had been returned because of name conflicts. The articles of incorporation for American Vending were finally filed several
weeks after the contract had been signed.
Although American Vending operated the car wash for
three years, it experienced financial troubles from the very
start. It failed to make any payments to the Morses on the
balance owing under the sales contract. American Vending
eventually defaulted on its debt obligation to its bank, and the
bank foreclosed on the car wash.
-

-

-

3. Ironically, both men were licensed lawyers. Morse, 881 P.2d at 918.
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The Morses sued American Vending, as well as Mr.
Durbano and Mr. Garn personallyO4The trial court dismissed
the Morses' claim against Mr. Durbano and Mr. Garn, finding
that American Vending was a de facto corporation and thus the
individuals could not be personally liable.' The court entered
judgment in favor of the Morses in the amount of $76,832 on
their claim against American Vending, but they have been
unable t o collect on the judgement because American Vending
has no income or assets! On appeal the Utah Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's ruling that Mr. Durbano and Mr.
Garn were not personally liable, holding that, following the
passage of the Utah Business Corporation Act,' the doctrines
of de facto corporations and corporation by estoppel were no
longer viable in Utah.
B. The Reasoning of the Utah Court of Appeals
1. De facto corporations
Interpreting two sections of the Utah Business Corporation
Act, sections 16-10-51 and 16-10-139; the court concluded that
the doctrine of de facto corporations was no longer a viable
doctrine in Utah. Section 51 provided that a corporation cannot
exist until the certificate of incorporation is issued:
Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the corporate existence shall begin, and the certificate of incorporation shall be conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 919.
7. Id. at 927.
8. The Utah Business Corporation A d has been repealed and replaced by
the Revised Utah Business Corporation Act, which was adapted from the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act. The sections of the Utah Revised Ad that are relevant to the issues of de fado corporations and corporation by estoppel are $8 1610a-203 to 204. Sedion 16-10a-203(1) provides in relevant part: "A corporation is
incorporated, and its corporate existence begins, when the articles of incorporation
are filed by the division . . . ." UTAHCODEANN. § 16-10a-203(1) (Supp. 1994).
UTAH CODEANN. $ 16-10a-204 (Supp. 1994) provides: "All persons purporting
to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing there was no incorporation under
this chapter, are jointly and severally liable for all liabilities created while so acting."
Under the Revised Act, the analysis and conclusions of this note remain the
same. See infra note 41 (discussing the impact of the Revised A d on the doctrine
of de fado corporations) and note 62 (discussing the impact of the Revised Ad on
the doctrine of corporation by estoppel).
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required of the incorporators have been complied with and the
corporation has been incorporated under this act, except as
against this state in a proceeding to cancel or revoke the
certificate of incorporation or for involuntary dissolution of
the corporation?

The court also relied upon section 139, which provided: "All
persons who assume to act as a corporation without authority
so to do shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts and
liabilities incurred or arising as a result thereof."1° In interpreting the meaning of these sections, the court relied on the
comments to the Model Business Corporation Act, from which
sections 51 and 139 were adopted. These comments expressly
state that the provisions were "designed to prohibit the application of any theory of de facto incorporation.""
Relying on the plain meaning of sections 51 and 139, as
well as the comments to the Model Business Corporation Act,
the court found that the trial court erred in concluding as a
matter of law that American Vending was a de facto corporation.12 In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished
Vincent Drug Co. u. State Tax Commi~sion,'~decided four
years after the enactment of the Utah Business Corporation
Act. In Vincent Drug the Utah Supreme Court applied the doctrine of de facto corporations but did not mention the Act. The
court reasoned that Vincent Drug was distinguishable on its
The court
facts and that it had been implicitly ~verruled.'~
also cited with approval cases from other jurisdictions in which
courts had not found Vincent Drug persuasive on the issue of
9. UTAHCODEANN. § 16-10-51 (1991) (repealed 1992).
10. Id. 8 16-10-139.
11. MODELBUSINESSCORP.ACT ANN. § 146 cmt., at 908 (1971); see also id.
5 56 cmt., at 205 (stating that "a de facto corporation cannot exist under the Model Act").
12. American Vending Servs., Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917, 935 (Utah App.
1994), cert. denied, No. 940470 (Utah Jan. 10, 1995).
13. 407 P.2d 683 (Utah 1965).
14. The court cited Gillham Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Ipson, 567 P.2d 163
(Utah 1977) (holding that the president of a nonexistent corporation was personally liable for the debt of the corporation), and Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870
(10th Cir. 1982) (holding that a president and secretary of a corporation who
signed debentures for the corporation two days before the corporation came into
existence were personally liable), as support that Vincent Drug had been implicitly
overruled. See also Thompson & Green Mach. Co. v. Music City Lumber Co., 683
S.W.2d 340, 344 ( T ~ M .Ct. App. 1984) (holding that Vincent Drug is unpersuasive
for the proposition that a de facto corporation can exist under the Model Business
Corporations Act).
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whether a de facto corporation could exist under the Model
Business Corporation Act. l5
2. Corporation by estoppel
The Utah Court of Appeals was unanimous in its decision
that the doctrine of corporation by estoppel did not apply to the
facts in Morse. The court was not unanimous, however, on
whether the Utah Business Corporation Act precluded applying
the doctrine of corporation by estoppel in every circumstance? The majority stated that the language of sections 51
and 139 prohibits the application of the doctrine of corporation
by estoppel in every situation, while the minority would allow
the doctrine to be applied in limited circumstance where "both
parties reasonably believed they are dealing with a corporation
and neither party has actual or constructive knowledge that
the corporation does not exist."" The court's statements concerning the applicability of the doctrine of corporation by estoppel to facts different than those presented in Morse, however,
should be viewed as dicta since the facts in that case did not
encompass every situation in which the doctrine could be applied.

A. De Facto Corporations at Common Law
At common law, corporations could be either de jure or de
facto.18 A de jure corporation is one that has been created as
the result of compliance with all of the constitutional or statutory requirements of a government entity.lg At common law,
15. Morse, 881 P.2d at 922 n.10 (citing Timberland Equip. Co. v. Davenport,
514 P.2d 1109, 1111 (Or. 1973) and Thompson & Green Mach. Co. v. Music City
Lumber Co., 683 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tern. Ct. App. 1984)).
16. The concurring opinion contains the view of the majority on the corporation by estoppel issue. Morse, 881 P.2d a t 927-29 (Garff, J., concurring).
17. Morse, 881 P.2d at 925.
18. See, e.g., Harris v. Stephens Wholesale Bldg. Supply Co., 309 So. 2d 115,
117-18 (Ala. Civ. App. 1975); Wayne N. Bradley, Comment, An Empirical Study of
Defective Incorporation, 39 EMORY L.J. 523, 524-30 (1990) (discussing the background and development of de facto corporations); Christopher P. Yates, Note, Rlinois Corporate Investors' Liability in the Case of Defective Incorporation, 1986 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1255, 1258-61 (discussing the development and application of the doctrine of de fado corporations); Fritz B. Ziegler, Comment, De Fwto Incorporation
and Estoppel to Deny Corporate Existence in Louisiana, 37 LA. L. REV. 1121, 1121. 23 (1977) (discussing the traditional common law rules of de fado corporations).
19. Harris, 309 So. 2d at 117.
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the doctrine of de facto corporations was created to protect individuals from personal liability when they were conducting
business before the corporate formalities were complete.20 A
de facto corporation could be brought into being when it could
be shown that 1) the state had a statute which authorized
incorporation, 2) a colorable attempt had been made to incorporate under the statute, and 3) actual corporate action had been
takenz1 In addition, the incorporators were, in some jurisdictions, required to have acted in good faith in claiming to be a
corporationF2 When these elements were met, a de facto corporation was created that, for all intents and purposes, had the
same rights and privileges as a de jure c o r p ~ r a t i o n . ~ ~

B. Corporation by Estoppel at Common Law
The doctrine of corporation by estoppel was applied when
the elements of a de facto corporation could not be met, yet
equity demanded that, because of their actions, parties be
barred from denying the existence of the corporationF4 As the
doctrine developed, corporation by estoppel became one of the
most confusing areas of corporate law, and many courts had
trouble defining and applying the doctrine.25 Many courts
have failed to recognize that the term "corporation by estoppel"
is a misnomer." Unlike a de facto corporation, no corporation
is deemed to exist?' Further, there is no estoppel in the general sense because in many situations there is no reliance?
20. American Vending Servs., Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917, 920-21 (Utah App.
1994), cert. denied, No. 940470 (Utah Jan. 10, 1995).
M.
21. See, e.g., Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 @.C. 1964); 8 WILLLAM
FLETCHER, FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATECORPORATIONS5 3761
(perm. ed. rev. vol. 1992); see also Harris, 309 So. 2d at 117.
22. See, e.g., Robertson, 197 A.2d a t 445.
23. See id. The only situation where a de facto corporation does not have all
of the rights of a de jure corporation is in a quo warranto proceeding brought by
the state against the corporation. See id.
24. See Bradley, supra note 18, a t 524-27, 529-30 (discussing the background
and development of corporations by estoppel); Yates, supra note 18, at 1258-61
(discussing the development and application of the doctrine of corporation by estoppel); Ziegler, supra note 18, at 1123-25 (discussing the traditional common law rule
of corporation by estoppel).
25. Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 514 P.2d 1109, 1111 (Or. 1973).
26. See Willis v. City of Valdez, 546 P.2d 570, 574 (Alaska 1976); Robertson,
197 A.2d a t 445; Ziegler, supra note 18, a t 1123 ("A 'corporation by estoppel' is not
really a corporation.").
27. See, e.g., Childs v. Philpot, 487 S.W.2d 637, 641 (Ark. 1972); Robertson,
197 A.2d a t 445.
28. See Robertson, 197 A.2d a t 445.
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Instead, the doctrine of corporation by estoppel is applied when
the court finds that, because of the agreements or conduct29of
the parties, it would be inequitable to allow the parties t o deny
the existence of the ~orporation.~~
Thus, the entity could not
conduct business as a legal entity, nor could it continue conducting business once the defective incorporation became
known.

C. The Model Business Corporation Act
In response to widespread criticism of the confusing and
the
arbitrary state of the law of defective incorp~ration,~'
drafters of the Model Business Corporation Act attempted t o
clarify when corporate existence begins. Two sections of the
Model Act, sections 56 and 146, have substantially changed the
way the courts have applied the common law corporation doctrine~.~~
First, section 56 provides that corporate existence cannot
begin until the certificate of incorporation is issued. Section 56
provides:
Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the corporate existence shall begin, and such certificate of incorporation shall be conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent
required to be performed by the incorporators have been complied with and that the corporation has been incorporated
under this Act, except as against this State in a proceeding to
cancel or revoke the certificate of incorporation or for involuntary dissolution of the c o r p ~ r a t i o n . ~ ~

29. Typical conduct that may result in the application of corporation by estoppel is signing a contract with an entity acknowledging it as a corporation before it
has been incorporated. See, e.g., Arbo Corp. v. Aidan MktgJDistribution, Inc., 639
F. Supp. 1512 (D.Minn. 1986); Southern-Gulf Marine Co. No. 9 v. Camcraft, Inc.,
410 So. 2d 1181 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 412 So. 2d 1115 (La. 1982).
30. See, e.g., Harris v. Stephens Wholesale Bldg. Supply Co., 309 So. 2d 115,
118 (Ala. Civ. App. 1975); Willis, 546 P.2d at 574; Childs, 487 S.W.2d at 641; Robertson, 197 A.2d a t 445-46; Harry Rich Corp. v. Feinberg, 518 So. 2d 377, 379 @la.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
31. See Robertson, 197 A.2d a t 445 n.6 (citing commentators and other authorities critical of the doctrine of de facto corporations); Ziegler, supra note 18, a t
1137-38 (describing this area of the law as "in a hopeless state of confusion" and
then describing the effect of the Model Business Corporation Act).
32. See Bradley, supra note 18, at 532-36 (discussing the history and the impact of the Model Act); Yates, supra note 18, a t 1261-64 (discussing the reasons for
and the drafting of the Model Act).
33. MODELBUSINESS CORP.ACT ANN. § 56. Section 56 is enacted nearly verbatim at UTAHCODEANN. 8 16-10-51 (repealed 1992). See supra note 9.
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The comments to this section eliminate any ambiguity about
the drafters' intent. They state that Tulnder the unequivocal
provisions of the Model A d , any steps short of securing a certificate of incorporation would not constitute apparent compliance. Therefore a de facto corporation cannot exist under the
Model
Second, section 146 indirectly addresses the issue of defeo
tive incorporation by providing that individuals who act on
behalf of a non-existent corporation are not protected by the
corporate shield and therefore may be personally liable.35Section 146 provides: "All persons who assume to act as a corporation without authority so to do shall be jointly and severally
liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or arising as a result
thereof."36 As with section 56, the comments reflect the
drafters' attempt t o avoid ambiguity about the effect of section
146 on the doctrine of de facto corporation: "This section is designed to prohibit the application of any theory of de facto in~orporation."~'
In 1961 the Utah Legislature adopted the Model Business Corporation Act, including sections 56" and
146;' without substantial modifi~ation.'~

A. De Facto Corporations
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly found that a de facto
corporation cannot exist under the Utah Business Corporation
Act:' In its common law application, the doctrine of de facto

34. MODELBUSINESSCOW. ACT ANN. 5 56 a t . , a t 205.
35. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV.80, 121-22 (1991) (stating that $ 146 led t o results that were
surprising in the context of the parties' intentions).
36. MODELBUSINESSCOW. ACT ANN. 5 146.
37. Id. 5 146 cmt., at 908.
38. UTAHCODEANN. $ 16-10-51 (repealed 1992). See supra note 9 and accompanying text for the text of this section.
39. Id. $ 16-10-139.
40. Id. $5 16-10-1 to 141.
41. American Vending Servs., Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917, 922 (Utah App.
1994), cert. denied, No. 940470 (Utah Jan. 10, 1995).
Under the Revised Utah Business Corporation Act de facto corporations are
also impossible. The beginning point for corporate existence, however, is different.
Under the Utah Business Corporation Act, corporate existence begins when the
certificate of incorporation is issued. UTAH CODEANN. 5 10-16-51 (repealed 1992).
Under the Revised Act, however, the "corporate existence begins, when the articles
of incorporation are filed by the division." Id. $ 16-10a-203(1).

3031 MERICAN VENDING SERVICES, INC. v. MORSE 311
corporations actually creates a corporation that is entitled t o all
of the benefits and rights of a de jure c~rporation.'~Under the
Utah Business Corporation Act, a corporation does not, and
cannot, exist until the issuance of the certificate of incorporat i o d 3 As the comments to the Model Business Corporation
Act point out, this provision makes the creation of a de facto
This conclusion has been reached by
corporation imp~ssible.~~
the majority of courts which have addressed the issue.45
The elimination of de facto corporations is sound public
policy. This area of the law had become too confusing and unpredictable; therefore, to stabilize business transactions, it was
necessary t o develop a clear rule defining when corporate existence begins.46Further, because the corporate shield is provided at the sufferance of the state, it should only offer protection
to those who have technically availed themselves of this privilege by fulfilling the state's requirements for incorporating.
Historically, the allowance of a de facto corporation was
thought t o be fair because it protected incorporators who, although they had not incorporated correctly, expected to have
the protection of a corporation." This policy of protecting individuals, however, should be balanced with the policy that individuals should be responsible for their own actions and commit42. See Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. 1964); FLETCHER, supra
note 21; Ziegler, supra note 18, at 1123.
43. MODELBUSINESSCORP.ACT ANN. 5 56.
44. Id. 5 56 cmt., at 205.
45. See, e.g., Bowers Bldg. Co. v. Altura Glass Co., 694 P.2d 876, 878 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1984); Robertson, 197 A.2d at 446; Don Swam Sales Corp. v. Echols, 287
S.E.2d 577, 578 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Timberline Equip. Co. v. Davenport, 514 P.2d
1109, 1110-11 (Or. 1973); Thompson & Green Mach. Co. v. Music City Lumber Co.,
683 S.W.2d 340, 344 (T~M.Ct. App. 1984); see also FLETCHER, supra note 21,
5 3762.10 (discussing the impact of the Model Business Corporation Ad on the
common law); Alexander H. Frey, Legal Analysis and the "De Facto" Doctrine, 100
U. PA. L. REV. 1153, 1178 (1952) (arguing, before the Model Business Corporation
Act was adopted, that the doctrine of de facto corporation should be eliminated);
Mark E. Noennig, Note, The De Facto Corporation Doctrine in Montana, 39 MONT.
L. REV. 305, 308-310 (1978) (discussing how the Model Business Corporation A d s
elimination of de facto corporations solves some of the problems created by the
common law "nullity" approach); Yates, szlpra note 18, at 1261 (discussing the impact of the Model Act on the doctrine of de fado corporations); Ziegler, supra note
18, at 1137-38.
46. See, e.g., Ziegler, supra note 18, at 1137 (stating that this area of the law
was "in a hopeless state of confusionw).
47. American Vending Servs., Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917, 920-21 (Utah App.
1994), cert. denied, No. 940470 (Utah Jan. 10, 1995); Ziegler, supm note 18, at
1121 (stating that de fado corporations developed to meet the demands of equity
and to protect those who had aded in good faith).
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ments. I n balancing these two policies, the protection of the
corporate shield should be provided only to those who have
properly met the state's requirements of incorporation. Under
the Utah Business Corporation Act, the requirements are
straightforward and easy to satisfy. Negligent or ignorant individuals should not be shielded from the effects of their actions
or bargains if they have not acted with sufficient care to meet
the requirements of the statute? The Utah Business Corporation Act balances both of these interests and establishes a
bright-line rule that makes it easy for even the least sophisticated individuals to know when they, or those they are dealing
with, are protected by the corporate shield.

B. Corporation by Estoppel
Although the Utah Court of Appeals reached the correct
result on the facts of Morse, its conclusion that the doctrine of
corporation by estoppel is totally eliminated by the Utah Business Corporation Act is not well reasoned and is bad p~licy."~
As is explained in the following sections, the court's analysis
was too broad because the Act does not require the court's
c o n c l ~ s i o n Instead,
.~~
the court should have recognized that,
although the doctrine is not applicable in all of the factual scenarios where it was applicable under the common law, circurnstances exist under which it may still be applied to prevent
injustice.

48. Under the Revised Utah Business Corporation Act, there is no possibility
that the corporation will not be properly formed as a consequence of a mistake
made by the state. Under the Revised Act, the corporate existence begins when the
articles of incorporation are "filed." UTAH CODEANN. $ 16-10a-203(1). This is an
improvement from the Utah Business Corporation Act, which provided that the
corporate existence began when the certificate of incorporation was issued by the
state, which increased the possibility that the corporation would not come into existence because of a mistake on the part of the state. Id. $ 16-10-51.
49. See inha notes 71 and 76 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Arbo Corp. v. Aidan MktgJDistribution, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1512,
1514 (D.Minn. 1986) (holding that while the Model Business Corporation Act does
eliminate de fado corporations, it does not necessarily affect the viability of an
estoppel defense); see also William L. Stocks, Note, Corporations-De Fmto Corporations-EstoppeLModel Business Act, 43 N.C. L. REV. 206, 210 (1964) (arguing
that the Model Business Corporation Act does not require the elimination of corporation by estoppel); Yates, supra note 18, at 1263-64 (stating that under the Model
Act the status of the doctrine of corporation by estoppel is unclear).
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1. Corporation by estoppel and de facto corporations are separate and distinct doctrines
The first important distinction the court of appeals failed
to make is that the doctrines of de facto corporations and corporation by estoppel are separate and distinct.51The doctrine of
de facto corporations has the effect of actually creating a legal
entity, while corporation by estoppel simply bars a limited
number of persons from denying the corporate existence in
resolving a specific dispute. Corporation by estoppel is an equitable principle which estops parties from denying the existence
t ~ ~ the
of a corporation, for the purpose of one l a ~ s u i where
parties have dealt with the association as a corporation or have
acknowledged the association as a corporation.
Historically, many courts have failed to recognize the difference between the two doctrines.53 Even courts which have
addressed the viability of these doctrines under the Model Act
have failed to recognize them as distinct doctrines.54This confusion has sometimes led the courts to treat the two doctrines
as if they serve the same purpose and thus both could be eliminated by the same logic. The better-reasoned view, however, is
that these doctrines serve separate and distinct purposes, and
therefore, the elimination of de facto corporations by the Model
Business Corporation Act does not necessarily eliminate the
doctrine of corporation by estoppel.55
51. See, e.g., Arbo Corp., 639 F. Supp. at 1514; Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d
443, 445 0.C. 1964) (discussing the separate functions of the two doctrines);
Ziegler, supra note 18, at 1124-25 (discussing the overlap between the doctrines of
de facto corporations and corporation by estoppel but recognizing the majority rule
that the two doctrines are separate).
52. See Childs v. Philpot, 487 S.W.2d 637, 641 (Ark. 1972); Ziegler, supra
note 18, at 1124 (discussing the Limitations on the doctrine of corporation by estoppel).
53. See, e.g., James v. Unknown Trustees, 220 P.2d 831, 835 (Okla. 1950)
(stating that the doctrine of corporation by estoppel may not be invoked unless the
corporation has at least a de fado existence).
54. See Robertson, 197 A.2d at 447 (stating that the doctrines of de facto
corporations and corporation by estoppel are independent, but holding that the
Model Act leads to the elimination of both doctrines by creating a bright-line rule
concerning the beginning of corporate existence); Thompson & Green Mach. Co. v.
Music City Lumber Co., 683 S.W.2d 340, 345 (T~M. Ct. App. 1984) (following
Robertson and holding that the Model Business Corporation Act eliminated both de
fado corporations and the doctrine of corporation by estoppel).
55. See Arbo Corp. v. Aidan MktgJDistribution, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1512, 1514
(D. Minn. 1986) (holding that the elimination of de fado corporations does not necessarily eliminate the doctrine of corporation by estoppel); Willis v. City of Valdez,
546 P.2d 570, 574 (Alaska 1976) (holding that because doctrine of corporation by
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The separate purposes served by these two doctrines were
indirectly recognized by the drafters of the Model Business
Corporation Act. The drafters commented in two places56that
their intention was to eliminate the doctrine of de facto corporations, but they did not ever mention its companion doctrine-corporation by estoppel. This omission is significant
because it must be assumed that the drafters intentionally
excluded it from the comments, and therefore did not intend for
the Model Act to eliminate corporation by estoppel. Many
courts have, with little explanation of their reasoning, concluded that the Act eliminated corporation by estoppel as well as de
facto corporation^.^' Other courts, however, have recognized
the separate nature and purpose of the two doctrines, and have
therefore held that it is possible for the principle of corporation
by estoppel t o continue t o exist although de facto corporations
are eliminated." In Morse, Judge Greenwood found the argument that corporation by estoppel could continue to exist under
the Model Business Corporation Act more persuasive. In her
concurring opinion she argued that there was no basis in the
comments to the Model Business Corporation Act t o support
the position that the Model Act eliminated corporation by esthe different purposes served by corporat ~ p p e lRecognizing
.~~
tion by estoppel, she argued that the doctrine should still be
applicable in limited circ~mstances.~~
While her suggested

estoppel is concerned with the a d s of the parties, and doctrine of de facto corporations is concerned with the legality of the corporation, corporation by estoppel is an
independent doctrine and is applicable where a de facto corporation cannot be
established).
56. See supra notes 34 and 37.
57. See Booker Custom Packing Co. v. Sallomi, 716 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986) (holding that an argument similar to corporation by estoppel is precluded by the Model Business Corporation Act without directly addressing the issue of
corporation by estoppel under the Act); Robertson, 197 A.2d at 447; Thompson &
Green Mach. Co., 683 S.W.2d a t 345.
58. See Arbo Corp., 639 F. Supp. at 1514 (holding that although the Model
Business Corporation Act eliminated de facto corporations it does not eliminate the
estoppel defense); Stocks, supra note 50, at 210 (criticizing Robertson for holding
that the Model Business Corporation Act eliminated corporation by estoppel and
arguing that the elimination of corporation by estoppel would result in injustice).
59. American Vending Sews., Inc. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917, 924 (Utah App.
1994) (Greenwood, J., concurring), cert. denied, No. 940470 (Utah Jan. 10, 1995).
60. The majority criticizes Judge Greenwood's analysis because she relied
upon Harry Rich Corp. v. Feinberg, 518 So. 2d 377 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1987), in
which corporation by estoppel was recognized by statute. The majority fails to
recognize that the Florida statute at issue in that case simply recognized the distinction that exists at common law. Just because the distinction was recognized by
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exceptions may have been too limited, it is significant that she
recognized that the Utah Business Corporation Act did not
eliminate the doctrine altogether.
The language of the Utah Business Corporation Act dealing with when corporate existence begins simply is not applicable to the doctrine of corporation by estoppel. The doctrine of
corporation by estoppel does not purport t o actually create a
corporation; no corporation comes into existence under the
doctrine. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' reasoning that the
Act's language must eliminate the doctrine is erroneous.
2. Factual scenarios where corporation by estoppel should not
be precluded by the Utah Business CorporationAct
Since the Utah Business Corporation Act does not expressly eliminate the doctrine of corporation by estoppel, the court
should have asked whether any provisions of the Act limit the
doctrine's application. Section 139, which holds individuals
liable for acts taken on behalf of a defectively formed corporation:' limits the application of the doctrine in some-but not
all-factual scenarios. There are scenarios where corporation
by estoppel could be applied and would not be inconsistent
with, or precluded by, section 1 3 9 . ~Whether
~
corporation by

statute in one state does not prevent the Utah courts from continuing to recognize
the common law distinction in the absence of a statute, especially when there is
nothing in the language of the Utah Act that would mandate that the doctrine be
rejected. Indeed, the Arbo Corp. court, aided by the reporters' notes to the statute,
recognized this very distinction where there was no language in the state statute
recognizing the doctrine. Arbo Corp., 639 F. Supp. at 1514. Regardless of the
source of the idea, the Utah courts should continue to recognize the separate purpose of corporation by estoppel.
61. Section 51, which addresses when the corporation's existence begins,
should not enter into the analysis of whether corporation by estoppel may apply,
because corporation by estoppel does not rely on the fiction that a corporation has
been created, but rather relies on equity, which requires that a party be estopped
from denying the existence of the corporation in a particular situation.
62. Under the Revised Utah Business Corporation Act ("Revised Ad"), which
replaces the Utah Business Corporation Act ("Act"), the same procedure should be
followed with nearly the same results. The doctrine of corporation by estoppel
should remain applicable unless its application is precluded by the Revised Act.
Under the Revised Act, corporation by estoppel will be applicable in more situations than it is under the Act. Under the Act, 8 139 precludes the application of
corporation by estoppel whenever its application would protect individuals who
have acted on behalf of a nonexistent corporation. UTAH CODE ANN. 8 16-10-139
(repealed 1992). The Revised Act, however, adds a knowledge requirement to this
provision and therefore would only preclude the application of corporation by estoppel when its application would protect individuals who have knowingly acted on

estoppel applies, therefore, must be determined on a case by
case basis. The doctrine of corporation by estoppel was developed as a tool with which the court could combat injustice, and
the doctrine's complete elimination will result in great injusti~e.~~
This analysis, however, is not as difficult as it may a t first
seem. According to one court, there are only five factual scenarios where corporation by estoppel could be appliedeB4A review of these five scenarios demonstrates how the doctrine of
corporation by estoppel should be applied as a tool to prevent
injustice.
a. Scenario 1. A defectively formed corporation sues
a third party and the third party is estopped from denying that
the plaintiff is a c o r p ~ r a t i o n An
. ~ ~example of this scenario is
Southern-Gulf Marine Co. No. 9 u. Camcraft, I ~ n c In
. ~ South~
ern-Gulf,a shipbuilder contracted with an entity to build a vessel for a fixed price. The entity purported to be a corporation
but in fact was not yet incorporated. Between the signing of the
contract and the completion of the vessel, the vessel appreciated in price and consequently the shipbuilder refused to deliver
the vessel to the corporation. The corporation's suit against the
shipbuilder was dismissed by the trial court, which found that
there was no valid contract and thus no valid cause of action,
based on the corporation's lack of existence when the contract
was executed. On appeal, the court reversed and found that
because the shipbuilder contracted with the entity as a corporation, the shipbuilder was estopped from denying the entity's
corporate existence.
b. Scenario 2. A third party sues a defectively
formed corporation and the defectively formed corporation is

behalf of a non-existent corporation. UTAHCODEANN. $ 16-10a-204 (emphasis added); see REVISED MODELBUSINESSCORP.ACT ANN. $ 204 cmt., at 2-47; Harry
Rich Corp. v. Feinberg, 518 So. 2d 377, 381 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing the impact of the Revised Act on the doctrine of corporation by estoppel).
63. See Stocks, supra note 50, at 210; Ziegler, supra note 18, at 1145 (arguing that the courts need corporation by estoppel to moderate the rigid approach of
the Model Act).
64. Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443, 445 (D.C. 1964).
65. See FLETCHER, supra note 21, $ 3910 (discussing cases and corporation by
estoppel under this factual scenario).
66. 410 So. 2d 1181 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 412 So. 2d 1115 (La.
1982). This case did not arise under the Model Business Corporation Act, but the
fads of this case illustrate one factual situation where serious injustice will result
if corporation by estoppel is eliminated.
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estopped from denying that it is a corp~ration.~~
An example
of this scenario is United States v. T h e o d ~ r e In
. ~ ~this case a
defectively formed corporation moved t o dismiss an action
against it by the Internal Revenue Service for failure t o produce its corporate records used in the preparation of a tax
return. The corporation argued that it could not be sued in its
corporate capacity because it had never filed articles of incorporation as required by state statute. Further, the corporation
argued that South Carolina had adopted the Model Business
Corporation Act, which set the filing of the articles of incorporation as the beginning of corporate existence. The court found
that the corporation had held itself out as a corporation t o the
public, to the government of South Carolina, and to the government of the United States and was therefore estopped from
denying its corporate existence.
c. Scenario 3. A third party sues the defective corporation, and the incorporators who held the entity out as a corporation are estopped from denying the existence of the corporatiod9 An example of this scenario is Peterson v. ~ a l o u n . ~ ~
In this case Mr. Peterson was enticed t o invest in a mortgage
company by his accountant, who was acting on behalf of the
unincorporated entity that sold Mr. Peterson the investment.
Mr. Peterson later sued the corporation for alleged violations of
the securities laws. The corporation moved t o have the suit dismissed, claiming that since it was not incorporated at the time
it entered into the contract t o sell the securities, it could not
have been a party to the contract. The court found that because
the accountant had purported to act on behalf of the corporation, the corporation could not deny its existence.
Under each of these first three scenarios, section 139 does
not apply because the corporation is the party rather than the
putative shareholders. If relief is to be provided under these
scenarios, it must be provided by applying corporation by estoppel. Under these scenarios, applying corporation by estoppel is
good public policy. The doctrine prevents the corporation or
persons it contracts with from escaping liability or avoiding
67. See FLETCHER,
supra note 21, 8 3930 (discussing cases and corporation by
estoppel in this factual scenario).
68. 347 F. Supp. 1070 (D.S.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 479 F.2d 749,
755 (4th Cir. 1973).
supm note 21, § 3938 (discussing cases and corporation by
69. See FLETCHER,
estoppel under this factual scenario).
70. 715 F. Supp. 212 m.D. Ill. 1989).
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obligations based solely on the corporation's negligence in com~~
parties to
plying with the corporate f ~ r m a l i t i e s .Allowing
escape liability simply because they failed to follow the state's
incorporation statutes provides a n incentive not to complete the
technical requirements of incorporation where being unincorporated works to a party's advantage in committing some mischief or fraud.
d. Scenario 4. Either a third party or the defective
corporation is estopped from denying the existence of the corporation because of prior pleadings that the parties have made in
~ example of this scenario is Spurlock u. Santhe l a w s ~ i t . 'An
ta Fe Pacific Railr~ad,'~in which Spurlock, the owner of the
surface estate, sued a railroad that owned the mineral estate,
for conversion. Spurlock argued several theories, including that
under the terms of the contract certain mineral rights were not
severed from the surface estate, and that because of the
~ ~ railrailroad's failure regarding corporate f ~ r m a l i t i e s ,the
road was not a corporation, and therefore, could not own the
mineral rights. The court found that Spurlock was estopped
from denying the existence of the railroad as a corporation
because Spurlock had pled that it was a corporation and, therefore, Spurlock had elected to treat the railroad as a corporationV5
Under this scenario, section 139 may preclude the application of corporation by estoppel, but only if the case involves a
person who has acted on behalf of a defectively formed corporation. If section 139 is not applicable, however, the application of
corporation by estoppel is sound public policy. It prevents parties who know of the corporate defects and nevertheless assert
the validity of the corporation from later denying the corporate
existence when it becomes convenient to do so. The application
of this rule should be flexible, however, to allow parties to

71. See Stocks, supm note 50, at 210 (stating that the complete elimination
of corporation by estoppel will result in injustice and illustrating the point with
fads similar to scenario two); Ziegler, supra note 18, at 1149-52 (discussing, in different terms, the same three factual scenarios and reaching the conclusion that
corporation by estoppel should be applied).
72. See FLETCHER, supm note 21, 88 3944-3952 (discussing cases and corporation by estoppel under this factual scenario).
73. 694 P.2d 299 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
74. SpurloclZs theory was that the railroad had de facto dissolved. While this
is slightly different from the defectively formed situations, the application of corporation by estoppel would work the same.
75. Spurlock, 694 P.2d a t 314.

3031 AMERICAN VENDING SERVICES, INC. v. MORSE 319

amend their complaints or abandon their suits without being
estopped if they were unaware the corporation's defects?
This result provides an incentive for parties to take wellthought-out positions and encourages efficiency in the resolution of legal disputes.
e. Scenario 5. A third party sues the individuals
behind the defective corporation but is estopped from denying
the existence of the corporation. The Morse case is a classic
example of this scenario. In an attempt t o escape liability, the
individuals behind American Vending Services Inc. wanted to
estop the Morses from denying the existence of the corporation.
Under these circumstances, section 139 provides that the individuals behind the entity are personally liable for acting on
behalf of a non-existent corporation. Because section 139 is
operable in this situation, it precludes the application of corporation by estoppel. This result is proper because if corporations
by estoppel were applied, the doctrine would enable individuals
to escape liability simply by their own negligence or bad
faith?' This outcome is consistent with the common law principle that corporation by estoppel should be applied to protect
those who have acted in good faith, but should never be applied
when it would be inequitableT8or would benefit a party who
has acted negligently or in bad faith.
By starting with the presumption that the doctrine of corporation by estoppel is applicable and then determining whether its application is disabled by section 139, a court can consistently reach just results. Such an approach would yield better
results than if the court were to blindly use corporation by
estoppel in every situation where it could apply. Such an approach would also yield better results than if the court were t o
blindly eliminate the doctrine t o the detriment of those who
have relied in good faith on the existence of the corporation and
who therefore cannot receive justice because the corporation
does not exist.

76. See W H E R , supm note 21, $8 3944-3952.
77. Ziegler, supra note 18, at 1146 (arguing that while the courts should apply corporation by estoppel in some situations, it should not be applied in this
factual scenario).
78. See Childs v. Philpot, 487 S.W.2d 637, 641 (Ark. 1972); Ziegler, supra
note 18, at 1124.
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De facto corporations and corporation by estoppel developed under the common law as a way for the courts to prevent
harsh results when parties innocently failed to comply with the
requirements of corporate formation. Over time this area of the
law became inconsistent and unpredictable. In an attempt to
create a bright-line rule regarding the beginning of corporate
existence, the drafters of the Model Business Corporation Act
eliminated the doctrine of de facto corporations. Questions have
remained, however, regarding the effect of the Model Act on
the doctrine of corporation by estoppel.
Morse is the first case in which the Utah courts have addressed the impact of the Model Act on de facto corporations
and corporation by estoppel. The Utah Court of Appeals correctly found that the Utah Business Corporations Act eliminated the possibility of de facto corporations. With respect to the
doctrine of corporation by estoppel, the court also reached the
correct result on the facts of Morse; however, the broad language of the court precluding the doctrine of corporation by
estoppel in all circumstances under the Act goes too far and is
not required by the Act. If followed, this conclusion would significantly tie the courts' hands i n preventing injustice.
Instead, courts should approach corporation by estoppel
questions with the presumption that the doctrine applies unless precluded by the Act. Section 139 does preclude the application of corporation by estoppel in some circumstances. In
other circumstances, it is good public policy to apply corporation by estoppel to prevent parties from benefitting from their
negligence or bad faith in complying with the formalities of
incorporation.

Douglas C. Waddoups

